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Decision making by nurses is now firmly
established on practice, policy and
educational agendas. New, constantly
evolving, roles, and a policy context that
is challenging traditional professional
boundaries (for example, the imminent
announcement on United Kingdom
(UK) nurse prescribing) mean that, more
than ever, nurses are being given
autonomy and power to be able to
exercise their decision choices. With this
freedom however, comes responsibility.
Responsibility to a new professional
body in the UK, responsibility to an
ever more informed public, and respon-
sibility to service commissioners and
colleagues who – quite rightly – expect
nursing to demonstrate its worth in the
health care team and contribution to the
health care product. Clinical decisions
are both the means by which this
responsibility is exercised, and ulti-
mately, the means by which nurses’
contribution to the production of health
will be judged.
Jean Harbison’s cogent and timely
response to my original paper
(Thompson 1999) unpacks some of the
rather crude arguments of the first
paper. In doing so, the author develops
a line of reasoning highlighting the
benefits of thinking of decision making
along a continuum (and the rejection of
either rational or intuitive decision
modes for all decisions). The paper is
well written and will, I hope, attract
responses from clinicians and academics
alike.
Harbison quite rightly implies that the
challenge for nursing is to highlight the
contribution of nurses to the production
of good health care outcomes, ‘…the
apparent assumption…is that because
nurses intend to benefit their patients,
their decision making actually does so’.
Recent papers from the field of primary
care suggest that, whilst the decisions
made by nurses may not be optimal in
terms of quality, their diagnostic and
treatment choices are certainly no
worse than those of other professions
(Lattimer et al. 1998, Shum et al. 2000,
Venning et al. 2000). However, what is
required – as Harbison highlights – is
the production of research evidence to
show the different ways in which nurses
make decisions can be improved.
Decisions need to be more accurate
(when diagnosing illness – or indeed
health), have the most positive impact
when making treatment choices, or have
the intended impact on understanding
or behaviour when choosing what infor-
mation to communicate to patients
regarding prognosis, risk or benefits.
Harbison misinterprets my original
claim (I can argue this now because of
the positive effect of hindsight bias)
that, ‘there is no point considering the
quality of decisions as we do not have
enough information about what consti-
tutes quality’. I stand by my original
assertion that the evidence of what
constitutes accurate nursing diagnoses,
or the optimal nursing intervention
choices for populations of patients is
still (relatively) small when compared
with the bio-medical literature.
However, the argument remains a justi-
fication for more descriptive research
not less. Not because, as Harbison
implies, I think there should be more
studies to add to the seemingly endless
volumes showing how nurses intuitively
know what is right without reference to
any gold standard (in the case of diag-
nosis) or assessment of alternatives (in
the case of interventions). Rather, I was
arguing that what we need is more
description of the decision tasks facing
nursing in its constituent arenas in order
that we can better match the modus
operandi of the cognitive continuum’s
categories with the decision choices
actually faced by nurses. Only by
matching strategies for decision making
to decision tasks in this way, shall we
gain a purchase on ‘what might be’ in
relation to steering nurses to make
better decisions. Of course, having
claimed that I was wrong Harbison then
points out the very point outlined above,
‘a justifiable decision for descriptive
research is to establish what judge-
ment/decision tasks nursing practice
actually requires, with a view to consid-
ering whether this is being done well’.
At York we have recently completed a
project examining the decisions of acute
care nurses (Thompson 1999) and we
are currently mapping the decision
choices of primary care nurses (due for
completion in 2002).
Harbison is incorrect when arguing
that Newell and Simon’s (1972) original
research on information processing is
‘value free’. The idea of rationality
(bounded or otherwise) as devoid of
value judgements is nonsensical. Ration-
ality is necessarily, and by definition,
concerned with finding the best (most
efficient, effective, efficacious) route to a
predetermined end point. In setting the
desired end point and the ‘best’ route to
achieving it, all sorts of value judge-
ments creep in. Admittedly, for decision
theorists there may be philosophical
devices such as the principles of decision
comparability and coherence (Lindley
1985) which recast these value judge-
ments as ‘science’ but the point remains:
value judgements and rational decision
making are not mutually exclusive.
Harbison rightly points out that intu-
ition is hardly random and handily shat-
ters (the Benner-esque) vision of the
nurse as an almost mystical figure
expertly exercising intuitive judgements
which only they can recognize. More-
over, her paper shows that simply
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because intuitive assessments somehow
‘feel right’ this is no justification for
relying upon them as a sole strategy. In
doing so, she highlights the emotive
language adopted by some commenta-
tors. Randall and Downie (1996) for
example, speaks of ‘sensitivity and imag-
ination’; Benner and Tanner (1987)
speak of ‘a sense of salience’; Rolfe
(1997) speaks of ‘the fuzzy nurse’.
Harbison suggests that ‘imagination’
might be the ability to generate hypo-
thetical situations. I would go further
and suggest that without an appropriate
appreciation of alternatives to ‘intelli-
gent guessing’ then one might as well set
about generating hypothetical results of
decisions as well. In fact Harbison
alludes to this situation, when high-
lighting the susceptibility to the biases
we are all prey during cognition (she
draws on the anchoring heuristic as an
example), a theme I have explored more
fully elsewhere (Lamond & Thompson
2000). Having established that intuition
is not the universal good that any cosmic
traveller systematically reviewing the
research literature on nurse decision
making might assume, Harbison
reinforces again the need for more
descriptive research which will enable
practitioners to choose the appropriate
cognitive strategy for a given decision
task. Particularly as evidence already
exists to show that the blanket applica-
tion of intuitive approaches to decision
making is often less effective than more
systematic approaches (Shamian 1991,
Letourneau & Jensen 1998, Mosher
et al. 1999, Warren et al. 1999).
Harbison recognizes that nursing has
by and large rejected Bayesian approa-
ches to improving decision making –
although in my opinion I am not sure
that we ever really engaged with them in
the first place, unlike our medical collea-
gues. However, I think the author’s
assertion that this rejection downplays
the issue of quality in nursing decisions
is a little unfair. Bayesian assessment of
decision probabilities relies on having
evidence which adequately enables the
revision of the likelihood of clinical
events or decision outcomes. I would
argue that much nursing research deals
with subjects that are either peripheral
to nursing choices and decisions (ques-
tion – do we really need another survey
on clinical supervision?) or else generate
results which have little impact on the
behaviours of nurses (repeat – do we
really need another survey on clinical
supervision?). By mapping the real life
decisions of nurses we can generate
research which is fit for the purposes
of reducing the uncertainties of real life
nurses. For an example look at the
‘bottom up’ approaches to commis-
sioning in Health Technology Assess-
ment Programmes in countries such as
the UK (http://www.ncchta.org/main.
htm) and Sweden (http://www.sbu.se/
sbu-site/index.html).
Jean Harbison’s paper questions my
interpretation of ‘correctness’ with
respect to the endpoint of decision
analysis. Of course, I would agree with
her that decision analysis has a focus on
the ‘optimum answer for that decision
owner’. However, the paper’s argu-
ments could be strengthened simply by
referring to the concept of utility. Deci-
sion analysis seeks to maximize utility: a
numerical measure of the attractiveness
of decision choices. As decisions in
health care almost always involve a
number of stakeholders it is possible –
indeed it is good practice – to question
‘whose utilities?’ are being catered for in
decisions. What decision analysis offers
is the opportunity for patients to see
exactly how much value is attached to
their opinions in the construction of
decision choices. Decision analysis
results are explicit and amenable to
harnessing the power of new technology
as a route to making the processes
involved easier and quicker. Given the
enhanced role (and by implication
weighting) of patient views in decision
analysis I would agree that the rejection,
on moral or ethical grounds, of decision
analysis is unjustified.
If I am interpreting Harbison
correctly she claims that, ‘predomin-
antly relevant to practising nurses are
intuition and peer decision making,
located at modes 6/5 [of the cognitive
continuum].’ I would dispute this.
Consider the decisions faced by one
medical staff nurse on an acute medical
ward observed in one 3-hour period last
year (Thompson et al. 2000) (Table 1):
The 18 decisions taken by this staff
nurse represent one decision task every
10 minutes. Clearly, not all of them
merit a full blown scientific experiment
(mode 1) but neither do they all merit
intuitive guesswork (mode 6). That said,
time is an important factor in decision
making and one might argue that the
time constraints associated with these
decision choices rule out any other
mechanism than intuition. The task for
nursing research is to ensure that for
those decisions requiring more system-
atic decision making modes, the
evidence is summarized concisely and
reliably in order that the results can be
factored into future (similar) decisions,
and analytical reasoning made as straight
forward as possible.
Jean Harbison suggests that bounded
rationality limits the usefulness of
accommodating evidence into practice.
Again, I would take an opposite tack on
this issue. For me, an evidence based
approach to decision making with its
emphasis on the explicit balancing of
patient preference, clinical expertise, the
available resources and the best quality
research evidence (DiCenso et al. 1998)
can do more to combat the effects of
bounded rationality than compound it.
Reframing clinical uncertainty and deci-
sion choices as focused clinical questions
(Flemming 1998) sets the boundaries for
considering decision choices, acts as a
framework for the explicit consideration
of alternatives, and helps to select the
most appropriate framework for the
consideration (appraisal) of evidence.
Reframing may exclude some alterna-
tives – but at least this exclusion is
explicit and visible. If it is visible then it
can be challenged, and the framework
revised. The ability to revise the proba-
bilities one attaches to decision choices
is (for me) the mark of a cognitively
‘open’ clinician. Unfortunately, the
evidence suggests that too often nurses
are excessively cautious in the revision
of their ideas, preferring – as Harbison
points out – the anchoring effects of
their initial hypothesis.
Jean Harbison implies that everyday
nursing practice may not require the use
of complex thinking. This may be true,
however, everyday practice does merit
the provision of robust and valid deci-
sion solutions. And whilst the decision
making processes of nurses may be
(or may appear to be to the decision
maker themselves) relatively simple, the
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application of those choices may not.
Decision support and new decision
technologies hold the promise of redu-
cing the variability associated with
simple decisions and at the same time
making the complex ones easier to
grapple with. Crucially, many of these
solutions come from disciplines other
than nursing. A point which reinforces
Harbison’s assertion that ‘[nursing’s]
reluctance to consider knowledge gener-
ated by disciplines other than nursing
has the potential to lead to isolation of
the profession.’ Linkages between
nurses and other professions which
focus on improving the process of
decision making are beginning to
happen. A few enlightened researchers
are using the accumulated knowledge
of cognitive psychologists and infor-
matics experts as a route to improving
the decisions made in the health care
arena and nursing’s input into those
decisions. For example, the Nursing
Research Initiative for Scotland is
examining:
• How nurses make decisions about
urinary catheterization.
• Constant observation and suicide: a
social judgement analysis.
• The development and evaluation of a
computerized clinical guidance tree for
benign prostatic hyperplasia and hyper-
tension.
See http://www.nris.gcal.ac.uk for more
details on this programme of work.
In conclusion then, I welcome this
contribution from Jean Harbison, and –
perhaps worryingly given that it is a
critique of my own work – find myself
agreeing with many of the paper’s argu-
ments. Maybe this is because of my
ability to revise my original views,
perhaps it is because of the ‘rose tinted’
impact of hindsight bias, or (as is more
likely) Harbison manages to add value
and weight to the arguments that I
posited originally. The idea of a cogni-
tive continuum has much to offer nurses
and its potential has yet to be
fully exploited. The exploration and
description of the decisions of nurses
constitutes a challenge for researchers.
Specifically, we need to generate know-
ledge able to reduce the uncertainties of
nurses. How the research community
responds to this challenge will dictate
whether we make the most of the new
and emerging technologies that are able
to support the decisions that nurses
make.
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